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BOOK REVIEWS
A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. Part I: The
Powers of Government. Vol. I: Federal and State Powers; Vol. II:
The Powers of the President. By BERNARD ScHvAI-z.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1963. Vol. I, Pp. xiv, 470. Vol. II, Pp. viii, 497. $12.50 per
volume.
Certainly a major fault of this effort of Professor Schwartz is that it is
an attempt to accomplish the impossible. A real treatise on the American
Constitution would satisfy a great demand, not only that of students who
fail to find elucidation in their law school courses (not to mention the
attractive market afforded by political scientists), but also that of teachers
who would like to afford their students an appropriate reference work.
The need is demonstrated if not met by the recently published collection
of essays on constitutional law sponsored by the Association of American
Law Schools. Without attempting to push the comparison too far, I
would suggest that the problem of such a task is akin to that of Hercules
in the Augean stables. The accumulation of the past when combined with
the production of the present makes it well-nigh impossible to deal with
the subject. Under the circumstances, a reviewer of these efforts might
well be satisfied to adapt one of Dr. Johnson's remarks and let it go at
that: "Sir, a woman's preaching is like a dog's walking on his hinder
legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."
Unfortunately, the longer I deliberated on these volumes the less
kindly I viewed them. And when I came to realize that any author whose
ego permitted him to label his treatise A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States would hardly be concerned about adverse
criticism by even the most eminent authority, no less mine, I decided to
suggest a few reasons why these volumes fail to measure up to the commentary they purport to be. For certainly, however important Mr. Justice
Story's work of similar title, or the commentaries of Blackstone and Kent,
few today can tell or care whether these works were well received by the
lesser minds of their day. To put it in another of Dr. Johnson's homely
metaphors: "A fly, Sir, may sting a stately horse, and make him wince;
but one is but an insect, and the other is a horse still."
The first of my reasons is that Professor Schwartz is extraordinarily
* Professor of Law, New York University.
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cavalier in his disposition of what some of his peers have regarded as
complex and difficult problems. For example, one question that has been
mooted throughout our constitutional history, the question of the
origins and justification for judicial review, is actually disposed of by
Schwartz in two sentences: "Judicial review was not specifically spelled
out in the Constitution because it was not deemed necessary. Judicial
review as an essential element of the law was part of the legal tradition
of the time."1 No evidence is adduced in support of this bald proposition
except perhaps Lord Coke's hoary dictum: "quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub seo et lege," or his sterile statement in Dr. Bonham's
Case. (Schwartz tells us that it makes no difference that what Coke said
on his feet he later retracted on his knees.) Never mind that generations
of scholars and lawyers have worried the problem, that the evidence in
support of Schwartz' thesis is scanty at best. Judicial review of national
government action exists; it was always thus; it was always intended to
be thus.
Schwartz is equally facile in disposing of the problem of distribution
of sovereignty in a federal nation. Others have found it not a simple
concept with which to deal, whatever conclusion they may reach. For
the author of these volumes, it presents no difficulty at all. Austin is
utilized to establish the definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty must rest
in one person or institution. In the United States such sovereignty can be
found nowhere. The states are limited by the supremacy clause and the
national government by the inhibitions of the Constitution. "If there
does exist sovereignty in the sense of supreme political power in the
American system, it exists only in the people as a whole, from whom
springs all legitimate authority. 'Any one,' said Daniel Webster in his
argument in an important case, 'who should look to any other source of
power than the people would be as much out of his mind as Don
Quixote, who imagined that he saw things which did not exist. Let us
all admit that the people are sovereign.'"2 Schwartz rather quixotically
also suggests that sovereignty was not to be found in the people: "Yet,
though our system may be said to be a government of the people (since
in form and in substance it emanates from them), it is wholly antithetical
to the concept of extreme popular sovereignty." 3 Sovereignty rests
nowhere in this nation and thus the states have no justification for
asserting that they ever exerted sovereign powers. Since it is indivisible,
they cannot have exerted a portion of the sovereign power. (The nation,
despite the absence of sovereign power, is superior to the states by reason
I Vol. I, p. 17.
2 Vol. I, p. 35.
3 Vol. I, p. 16.
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of the supremacy clause.) Even "cooperative federalism has behind it the
ultimate sanction of federal coercion-contradiction in terms though
that may be." 4
Second, Professor Schwartz seems to have amended Holmes' famous
dictum to read: "The life of the law is not reason, it is rhetoric." And
usually someone else's rhetoric. The Webster quotation already noted
is one example. Webster supplies another. The subject is the power of
the national judiciary to determine the constitutionality of state action.
It is not a subject frequently mooted by scholars any more. Even the
most reticent supporters of judicial review, like Judge Learned Hand 5
and Professor Sidney Hook, 6 concede this power to the national judiciary.
But Schwartz' proof leaves something to be desired, if rhetoric alone will
not satisfy. The power of review of the constitutionality of state action
must be placed in the national judiciary because the only alternative
would be to leave it to the states to judge for themselves. The reason
that alternative is not feasible is to be found, we are told, in Webster's
"celebrated Reply to Hayne, 'the honorable gentleman says, that the
States will only interfere, by their power, to preserve the Constitution.
They will not destroy it, they will not impair it; they will only save, they
will only preserve, they will only strengthen itIAh, Sir, this is but the
old story.' "7 One cannot help but wonder whether the rhetoric would
be any less effective had the words "Supreme Court Justices" been
substituted for the word "States" in the quotation. But perhaps the
justification is to be found not in Webster's rhetoric but in Schwartz'
own: "The high Justices are men set apart-the depositaries of the lawwho by their disciplined training and tradition and withdrawal from the
usual temptations of private interest may be expected to be as free from
partiality as the lot of man will admit."8 As a statement of the ideal no
one could quarrel with the proposition; as a statement of fact its accuracy
is something less than doubtful.
It is true that Schwartz in at least one place resolves a conflict between
rhetors by reason. He accepts the Marshallian principle that "the power
to tax . . . involves the power to destroy." 9 He rejects Holmes' reply:
"The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."10
Unfortunately, the reason he uses is hardly persuasive: "The power to
tax is one which is peculiarly insusceptible to quantitative differences of
4 Vol. I, p. 83.
5 THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
6 THE PARADoxzs OF FR.EDom (1962).
7 Vol. I, p. 47.

8 Vol. I, p. 46.
9 Vol. I, p. 47.

10 Vol. I, p. 48.
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degree."" I should think that the power to tax is one peculiarly susceptible to quantitative differences in degree. And I think Schwartz would
agree, at least to the extent of distinguishing discriminatory taxes from
nondiscriminatory taxes in appropriate circumstances.
Third, Schwartz either deliberately or inadvertently is guilty of important error, or more charitably, is guilty of ambiguity that will lead the
reader into error. Thus, for purposes of establishing the appropriate
principles, Schwartz delineates between government corporations that
are government agencies and those that are not. "The only question that
remains is that of whether the incidence of a particular state tax is in
fact upon a federal function or instrumentality. If the state tax must be
paid directly by a federal agency, it is, of course, invalid. In this sense,
an agency of the United States is any authority within the Federal
Government (regardless of whether its formal title be that of department,
bureau, division, commission, board, or some other name, or where in
the tripartite governmental structure it be located) or owned by the
Government. In the latter category would fall the government corporation, of the type involved in McCulloch v. Maryland itself, whose stock is
owned by the United States.... Even though such corporation has been
chartered by the Congress to carry out specified federal policies, it cannot be deemed a federal instrumentality for purposes of tax immunity."' 2
One wonders whether it would make any difference to Professor Schwartz
that the Bank of the United States was not owned by the United States,
that the United States had a minority stock interest, that representation
among the directors reflected stock ownership, and that the bank was
run as a private concern.
This introduces the real deficiency of these volumes. The use of
ideology to settle hard questions, the reliance on rhetoric rather than
reason, the proliferation of error, none of these separately or together
explain the essential failure of the book. The real defect lies in the
distortion of history in order to justify conclusions that history would
not justify. This utilization of "anti-history," as Professor Roche calls
it,' 3 is not unique. I recently attended a conference at my own law
school where some of the most eminent scholars would engage in the
rewriting of the history of the fourteenth amendment rather than
concede that its history would not support the conclusions they favored.
Constitutional law cannot be separated from constitutional history.
That does not mean that constitutional law is today whatever it was
i

Ibid.
Ibid.
RocHE, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, With Soul So
Dead ... ?", 1963 Sup. CT. R.-v. 325, 326.
12
13
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yesterday. It is because constitutional law is a process rather than a
static set of rules that a commentary can no longer encompass it. This
appears to have driven Professor Schwartz to describing to the best of his
ability that which is, or was, at the moment of writing, and then to
amend history to demonstrate that this was always so. Thus, he may well
be right in suggesting that the federalism that once called for division of
sovereign power between nation and states (and the people, if you will)
has disappeared. It is different, however, to say that it disappeared and to
say that it never existed.
Having said all that, I would say one thing more. The book is not
without merit. Most of its propositions of law are accurate. A student
cramming for a typical state bar examination would probably find in
here all he possibly need know of the subject. He will not have an
accurate picture of how the current rules developed or what the process
is that is likely to transmute them into something different in the future.
But bar examiners are not interested in those things. Neither, I suspect,
are most students, most lawyers, most professors. For these, and for the
political science market to which I already alluded, the volumes will
fill a longfelt need. Professor Schwartz may prefer the solace of royalties
to the fulsome praise of critics. I expect that there will be much more of
the former than the latter.
PHILIP B. KURLAND*
Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago.

The Geography of Intellect. By NATHANIEL WEYL and STEFAN
Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963. Pp. xiii, 299. $7.95.

POSSONY.

Race is today in the forefront of those social and scientific issues where
the search for truth is obstructed by partisan politics. Because feelings on
racial issues are so intense, intelligence often takes a back seat to ideology.
What passes for blocks of scientific truth are gathered not to build an
intellectual edifice, but to hurl at our political opponents. A person's
interpretation of scientific or historical data respecting race can be inferred with considerable accuracy from his position on the fluoridation
of water. Consequently practically everything published for popular consumption and concerned with race, including The Geography of Intellect,
is special pleading and is to be identified with one or another political
syndrome. 1 The liberal syndrome is often as obnoxious to the search for
1 It is certainly true that there is no necessary identity between views on race and
politics, see, e.g., Sharp, The Conservative Fellow Traveler, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 704
(19653), but it is a rare economic liberal who is not also liberal on civil rights; and

